How "social" is the social Simon effect? by Dolk, T. et al.
According to the dimensional overlap model (Kornblum et al., 
1990) the standard Simon effect can be explained by a match 
between the spatially irrelevant dimension of the stimulus and the 
relevant response dimension (Hommel et al., 2001). Accordingly, 
responses are assumed to be automatically activated if the stimulus 
spatially corresponds to the correct response and thus facilitate task 
performance, whereas a lack of correspondence between stimulus–
response pairs leads to response competition.
It is fair to say that the mechanisms underlying the SSE are 
poorly understood. Some authors have claimed that, due to the 
fundamentally social nature of perception and action, people auto-
matically co-represent other people’s actions (Knoblich and Sebanz, 
2006). However, a finding that does not seem to be completely in 
line with the idea of action co-representation being social, auto-
matic, and mandatory is that the SSE is fully present in autistic 
participants (Sebanz et al., 2005), who can be assumed to have 
difficulties processing social information. According to Guagnanoa 
et al. (2010), the major role of the co-actor in the social Simon task 
might be to provide a spatial reference frame that allows coding 
of one’s own action as left or right relative to the other person – 
just as one’s own action alternatives provide a reference frame for 
relative response coding (Hommel, 1996). Guagnanoa et al. (2010) 
further claimed that this reference frame can only be used if the 
other person is located within a participant’s peripersonal space. 
In line with a spatial reference explanation for the SSE, the authors 
were able to show that the SSE breaks down if the two co-actors 
INTRODUCTION
Many activities we perform in daily life are carried out together 
with other people. But how do we mentally represent other people’s 
actions and how does this affect our own behavior?
Recent research suggests that joint action can lead to the 
representation of one’s own and other’s actions. This “action 
co-representation” is thought to facilitate action prediction and 
coordination of one’s own actions with those of others (Sebanz 
et al., 2006). Evidence for this view stems from the “social Simon 
task” developed by Sebanz et al. (2003). In the standard Simon 
task (Simon and Rudell, 1967; Simon, 1990), participants typi-
cally carry out spatially defined responses (e.g., left and right key 
presses) to non-spatial stimulus attributes (e.g., auditory pitch or 
visual color) that randomly appear on the left or right. For example, 
participants are required to press a right key whenever they perceive 
a high-pitched tone and a left key in response to a low-pitched 
tone. Although stimulus location is completely irrelevant in this 
task, responses are typically faster when they spatially correspond 
to the stimulus signaling them. That is, spatial stimulus–response 
compatibility facilitates task performance, a phenomenon that has 
come to be known as the Simon effect. Commonly, this effect disap-
pears when a participant responds to only one of the two stimuli, 
rendering the task a “go–nogo task” (Hommel, 1996). However, if 
the same go–nogo task is shared between two participants so that 
each of them operates one of the two responses, a Simon effect is 
observed (Sebanz et al., 2003) – the “social Simon effect” (SSE).
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are seated outside of arm’s reach. However, this approach does not 
easily explain why an individual’s bad mood (Kuhbandner et al., 
2010) or negative relationship with the co-actor (Hommel et al., 
2009) eliminates the effect.
In the present study, we make a further attempt to clarify what 
the notion of action co-representation might mean, what it refers 
to, and in which sense it might account for the SSE. In essence, it 
may be possible to distinguish between three concepts of action 
co-representation, ranging from strong to weak. According to the 
first, strong concept, the SSE is assumed to be functionally simi-
lar to the effect obtained when one person is taking care of both 
responses (Sebanz et al., 2003). Following this line of reasoning, 
the SSE is due to the cognitive integration of the co-actor and his/
her actions into the actor’s body scheme. The second, intermediate 
concept, assumes that actors represent information about their 
co-actor and his/her actions without integrating it with represen-
tations of their own body and actions. This co-representation of 
the self and other provides a reference frame for the (e.g., spatial) 
coding of an individual’s own actions relative to the other person 
and his/her actions (Guagnanoa et al., 2010). Thus, rather than 
incorporating the other person into the actor’s body schema, the 
co-actor is represented as a social agent responsible for the alterna-
tive action separately from one’s own body and action. According 
to the third, weak concept, the co-actor does not function as a 
social being but mainly by virtue of producing particular events 
(actions with perceivable effects), which serve as reference for cod-
ing one’s own action.
Our experiments proceeded from testing the strongest to the 
weakest concept. In Experiment 1, we tested whether the SSE is 
affected by the perceived ownership of another person’s hand as 
suggested by a strong conceptualization of action co- representation 
(Sebanz et al., 2003; Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006). A reliable par-
adigm to experimentally manipulate the sense of ownership of 
another person’s hand is the rubber hand illusion (RHI; Botvinick 
and Cohen, 1998). Here, a rubber hand (or another person’s hand) 
is stroked either synchronously or asynchronously. During syn-
chronous stroking, the subject commonly feels the illusion that the 
seen rubber (or foreign) hand becomes a part of his/her own body.
We experimentally combined the RHI with an auditory social 
Simon task. In Experiments 2 and 3, we gradually de-socialized 
the task situation. In Experiment 2, we tested if we could find evi-
dence of a SSE without the active involvement of the co-actor. 
In Experiment 3, we excluded the co-actor from the task setting 
altogether to test the weak concept of action co-representation.
EXPERIMENT 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether the SSE relies 
on or varies as a function of action co-representation induced by 
the RHI. Participants performed an auditory social Simon task 
while the perceived ownership of another person’s hand (i.e., syn-
chronous vs. asynchronous stroking) was manipulated.
The RHI is assumed to arise from a multimodal conflict between 
vision, touch, and proprioception (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris and 
Haggard, 2005; Kammers et al., 2009). As vision usually dominates 
touch and proprioception (Constantini and Haggard, 2007), the 
RHI emerges as a consequence of synchronous but not asynchro-
nous stroking. When stroking is synchronous, the sense of owner-
ship is strong. As a result, the activity of the other hand should be 
more strongly attributed to one’s own body and thus induce an 
integration of another person into one’s own action representation. 
Conversely, in the asynchronous stroking condition, the other hand 
is more likely to be attributed to a different actor (Botvinick and 
Cohen, 1998) and thus, clearly separated from one’s own action. 
This condition was hypothesized to work against the strong concept 
of action co-representation.
If the SSE relies on the cognitive integration of the co-actor and 
his/her actions into the actor’s body schema (strong concept), syn-
chronous stroking should create a more pronounced SSE compared 
to asynchronous stroking. However, if an actor tends to represent 
the co-actor as separate from him/herself and not integrate the 
other’s actions into their own body schema (intermediate concept), 
synchronous stroking might actually lead to a smaller, rather than 
a larger SSE than asynchronous stroking does. This is because the 
asynchronous stroking might increase the saliency of the other 
person’s hand and its actions, and thereby provide a stronger spatial 
reference for coding the actor’s own action.
METHODS
Participants
Forty healthy undergraduate students (20 female; 20–25 years of 
age, mean age = 23.8) with no history of neurological or hearing 
problems participated in Experiment 1. Twenty served as actual 
participants (henceforth called actors) and 20 as co-actors (see 
Figure 1). The participants were all right-handed as assessed by 
the Edinburgh Inventory (Olfield, 1971), had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, were naive with regard to the hypothesis of the 
experiment and were paid €14 for participating.
Apparatus and stimuli
An auditory Simon task (go–nogo task) was used. In each trial, one 
of two sounds designed by van Steenbergen (2007) and chosen as go 
(sound A) and nogo (sound B) was presented via two loudspeakers 
separated by a distance of 1 m at approximately 60 dB to either the 
left or right side of both participants.
FIGURE 1 | Experimental setting in Experiment 1. Gray shaded areas 
indicate areas obscured from view.
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and asynchronous stroking conditions differed only in the phase 
of the temporal structures of visual and tactile stimulation. The 
stroking procedure in each induction phase lasted for about 3-min. 
After the stimulation, both participant and co-actor were asked to 
fill out the RHI Questionnaire.
After completing the questionnaires, the experimental phase 
started. There were four blocks of 64 trials for each participant and 
co-actor (32 with spatially compatible stimulus–response relation-
ships and 32 with spatially incompatible relationships). Each trial 
began with the presentation of the warning sound. After 1000 ms, 
the critical sound – either sound A or B – was presented to the 
right or the left side of both the participant and co-actor, requir-
ing a response as quickly and as accurately as possible. Participant 
and co-actor were instructed to fixate on the other’s hand and to 
respond exclusively to the sound assigned to them, irrespective 
of its location. Each response was followed by a 1000 ms inter-
stimulus-interval (ISI) and 3000 ms stroking, which was always 
congruent to the stroking type of the corresponding induction 
period (either synchronous or asynchronous) to refresh the RHI 
(see Figure 2).
Feedback [mean reaction time (RT) and percentage correct] as 
well as a 2-min break were provided at the end of each block. After 
completing the first four blocks, participants were asked to fill in 
the RHI Questionnaire again, which was followed by a 5-min break 
to avoid carryover effects to the second session of the experiment. 
After the break, the second session started. The procedure was the 
same as in the first session except for the type of stimulation, which 
was always different from that in the first session. The order of 
stimulation type (synchronous followed by asynchronous stroking 
or vice versa) was counterbalanced across participants.
RESULTS
In the following, only data from the actual participants (actors) 
were analyzed.
Rubber hand questionnaire
Participants experienced the co-actor’s hand as their own hand 
as a consequence of synchronous but not asynchronous stroking 
during both the induction and experimental phase: The RHI was 
 significantly stronger after synchronous than after asynchronous 
To experimentally induce a sense of ownership of the other 
person’s hand, we made use of the RHI. This involved stimulat-
ing the actor’s and the co-actor’s hand mechanically by means of 
two computer-controlled stepper motors, each with two identical 
paintbrushes attached, allowing the precise control of onset, direc-
tion, speed, and duration of both steppers independently. Following 
Lloyd (2007), the distance between both stroking devices was about 
22.5 cm.
Subjective measures
Participants rated the perceived strength of the RHI by working 
through nine statements directly after each induction and experi-
mental phase. The statements were translated from the original 
RHI Questionnaire (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) and partici-
pants were to agree or disagree on a visual analog scale from left 
(0 = “completely disagree”) to right (10 = “completely agree”). 
The first three statements are suggested to capture the core of the 
illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2008; 
Kammers et al., 2009): (1) “It seemed as if I were feeling the touch 
of the paintbrush in the location where I saw the rubber hand 
touched”; (2) “It seemed as though the touch I felt was caused 
by the paintbrush touching the rubber hand”; (3) “I felt as if the 
rubber hand were my hand.” A successful RHI induction would be 
indicated by higher ratings after synchronous than asynchronous 
visual–tactile stimulation.
Task and procedure
The experiment consisted of two consecutive sessions, each includ-
ing an induction and an experimental phase. To avoid carryover 
effects, both sessions were separated by a 5-min mandatory break. 
Prior to the induction phase, participants were seated next to each 
other. The actual participant (see Figure 1) was always seated on 
the right and was asked to place his/her left index finger under the 
stroking device, so that the paintbrush could stimulate the occluded 
index finger from the knuckle to the fingertip or vice versa. His/her 
right index finger rested on the right response button. Randomly 
chosen co-actors, whose performance was not analyzed, were always 
seated on the left. They rested their left index finger on the left 
response button (80 cm between the two response buttons) directly 
under the left stroking device and their right hand on their lap 
under the table. After participant and co-actor were seated and 
had placed their hands in the correct positions, a white towel was 
placed over their shoulders and arms to obscure everything on 
the table except the co-actor’s left and the participant’s right hand 
(see Figure 1).
The experiment started with the induction phase. The stimula-
tion was delivered mechanically by two stepper motors to which 
paintbrushes were attached. The amount of stimulation (onset, 
direction, speed, and duration) was precisely matched across con-
ditions. To avoid habituation effects, the speed and direction of 
the paintbrushes were unpredictable and changed randomly every 
5 s. In the synchronous condition, the participant’s and the co-
actor’s left index fingers were stroked in synchrony, with identical 
location, timing, and trajectory parameters. In the asynchronous 
condition, the parameters differed between the two stroked fingers, 
while the total amount of stimulation for both index fingers was 
the same as in the synchronous condition. Thus, the synchronous 
FIGURE 2 | Stimulus sequence in each trial. Trials started with the 
presentation of the warning sound. After 1000 ms, the critical sound (either A 
or B) appeared on the left or right of both participants. Participants had to 
respond within 3000 ms. The reaction was followed by an inter-stimulus-
interval (ISI) of 1000 ms and 3000 ms stroking.
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stroking conditions. Second, we found the effect to be smaller, rather 
than larger, with synchronous than with asynchronous stroking. 
Thus, the incorporation of another person’s hand into one’s own 
body schema through the RHI (induced by synchronous stroking) 
reduces the SSE as compared to a condition where the co-actor is 
represented as a separate actor (induced by asynchronous stroking). 
This interpretation is supported by the subjective rating of the sense 
of ownership of the co-actor’s hand in the synchronous stroking 
condition, which indicates that the experimental RHI manipulation 
was successful across all phases of the experiment.
These results provide considerable evidence against a strong 
concept of action co-representation as a mechanism underlying 
the SSE. That is, the SSE seems to occur even though actors rep-
resent their own action and the action of their co-actor sepa-
rately. Emphasizing the difference between the two actions – or the 
related effectors – leads to a more pronounced SSE. This increase 
of the SSE in the asynchronous stroking condition is in line with 
the assumption that the SSE is established by the coding of one’s 
action in reference to other actions (intermediate concept) or sali-
ent events (weak concept). Referential coding is known to be a basic 
principle operating in the Simon task (Hommel, 1993). Stimuli 
have been shown to be spatially coded relative to other stimuli 
that are either voluntarily attended to (Nicoletti and Umiltà, 
1989) or that are salient enough to attract attention involuntarily 
(Treccani et al., 2006). With respect to action, response location 
has been shown to be coded in reference to other possible or recent 
responses (Hommel, 1996), in particular on spatial dimensions 
that help to discriminate between response alternatives (Ansorge 
and Wühr, 2004).
Given that most authors agree that the Simon effect is due to some 
sort of match or mismatch between spatial stimulus and response 
codes (Kornblum et al., 1990; Prinz, 1990; Hommel et al., 2001), 
the effect can only occur if stimulus location and response location 
are coded on the same dimension – as left and right in our case. In 
a standard Simon task, where the same participant performs both 
responses, this is very likely to happen, as the left–right dimension 
is particularly salient and provides the best discriminability between 
the two responses. In the social Simon task, however, participants 
operate only one response, so there is no actual need for spatial 
coding. Yet, if a co-actor (or perhaps another event) is sufficiently 
salient, people may nevertheless tend to code their response in 
reference to the spatial location of the other person or event (cf. 
Guagnanoa et al., 2010).
According to this reasoning, the social aspect of the joint-action 
situation created by the social Simon task may be just one of per-
haps many factors that attract attention to other events and thereby 
induce the referential coding of one’s own action, thus creating or 
enhancing the SSE. One implication of this possibility is that the 
active involvement of the co-actor in the present task might not 
necessarily induce referential response coding and elicit the SSE. 
To test this possibility, we performed a second experiment that 
included a now inactive but still salient “co-actor.”
EXPERIMENT 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to test whether the SSE can also be 
obtained with an inactive co-actor (to whom we will nevertheless 
keep referring to as “co-actor” for the sake of convenience). To do 
stroking (RHI-related questions 1–2 after the induction and 1–3 
after the experimental phase; two-way paired-sample t-tests; all 
ps < 0.05).
Simon task
Reaction times. Responses were coded as compatible (stimulus 
ipsilateral to the correct response side) and incompatible (stimulus 
 contralateral to the correct response side). Mean RTs on the auditory 
social go–nogo Simon task for the 20 actual participants were submit-
ted to a 2 (Compatibility: compatible, incompatible) × 2 (Stroking: 
synchronous, asynchronous) within-subjects repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis showed a significant 
main effect of Compatibility [F(1,19) = 25.46, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.57] 
indicating that responses were faster with spatially compatible (mean 
RT = 291 ms) than with incompatible stimulus–response relation-
ships (mean RT = 313 ms). More importantly, the compatibility 
effect varied with stroking, as indicated by a significant interaction 
of Compatibility × Stroking [F(1,19) = 5.88, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.24; see 
Figure 3]. The 29 ms compatibility effect observed in the asynchronous 
stroking condition was significantly larger [F(1,19) = 25.17, p < 0.001, 
η2 = 0.57] than the 15 ms compatibility effect in the synchronous 
stroking condition [F(1,19) = 10.82, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.36; see Figure 3]. 
The main effect of Stroking was not significant [F(1,19) < 1, η2 = 0.01]. 
To check for possible task order effects, we performed an additional 
ANOVA with Order as a between-subjects factor – but the three-way 
interaction was not significant [F(1,18) = 1.40, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.07].
Error rates. We observed a significant main effect of Compatibility 
[F(1,19) = 12.67, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.40], indicating higher error rates 
for incompatible (1.0%) than for compatible trials (0.3%). The 
interaction of Compatibility × Stroking was far from significance 
[F(1,19) < 1, η2 = 0.01], which rules out a speed–accuracy trade-off.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this experiment was to test predictions of a strong 
concept of action co-representation accounting for the SSE. In par-
ticular, we investigated whether the SSE is mediated by the degree 
to which the active hand of a co-actor is perceived to be a part of 
the actor’s own body.
First of all, we were able to replicate the findings of Sebanz et al. 
(2003), confirming that our particular setup was sufficiently sensi-
tive to elicit the SSE in both the synchronous and the asynchronous 
FIGURE 3 | Mean reaction time as a function of the type of stimulation 
and spatial stimulus–response compatibility. Error bars represent standard 
errors of the mean differences. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Error rates
Neither the effects of Compatibility [F(1,19) = 2.49, p > 0.05, 
η2 = 0.12] and Stroking [F(1,19) < 1, η2 = 0.01], nor the interac-
tion of Compatibility × Stroking were significant [F(1,19) = 1.15, 
p > 0.05, η2 = 0.06].
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate whether the SSE can 
be obtained independent of the active involvement of another 
person. We found a significant overall Simon effect, which did 
not vary with the type of stroking. Extending previous findings 
(Guagnanoa et al., 2010), the present results suggest that the SSE 
can be established irrespective of what the other person is doing 
and whether this person is actively involved in the same or any 
other task.
This provides evidence against the interpretation of the SSE as 
a genuine joint-action effect (Sebanz et al., 2006) or as evidence 
for shared task representations (Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006; Ruys 
and Aarts, 2010). It also challenges the claim that it is “the presence 
of an active confederate” that provides the crucial reference for 
coding one’s own action in space (Guagnanoa et al., 2010). This is 
not to say that the activity of the co-actor in Experiment 1 played 
no role at all. For one, the size of the SSE under asynchronous 
stroking was significantly smaller in Experiment 2 (13 ms) than it 
was in Experiment 1 [29 ms; F(1,38) = 5.48, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.13] 
and, for another, the type of stroking affected the size of the SSE 
in Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2. This suggests that the 
representation of one’s own response is equipped with a spatial 
feature (right) if a second person is actively engaged in the task 
(Experiment 1) or if a non-social event, such as the movement of 
the stroking device, is present (Experiment 2). Thus, once another 
action alternative is sufficiently salient (e.g., the movement of the 
stroking device in the other response dimension), one’s own action 
seems to be coded with reference to it, thus favoring the weak con-
cept of action co-representation.
However, the finding of a Simon effect in Experiment 2 might 
alternatively be explained by the assumption that the mere pres-
ence of another person provided a reference for the coding of the 
alternative action event to one’s own action (intermediate concept). 
In order to test this alternative explanation, we performed a third 
experiment.
so, we replicated Experiment 1 but now de-socialized the task to 
some degree: The co-actor no longer responded but sat passively 
next to the actual participant. If the co-actor provides a spatial 
reference frame for the coding of one’s own action as left or right 
relative to the other person, one should expect a SSE even with an 
inactive co-actor. By contrast, however, if the active participation of 
the co-actor as a responding agent is crucial for the SSE to emerge 
as the original approach of Guagnanoa et al. (2010) suggests, the 
Simon effect should disappear.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty new healthy undergraduate students (10 female; 21–30 years 
of age, mean age = 24.8) with no history of neurological or hearing 
problems participated in Experiment 2. They fulfilled the same 
criteria and were treated in the same way as the participants in 
Experiment 1.
Apparatus, stimuli, task, and procedure
These were the same as in Experiment 1, with the following excep-
tions. The co-actor, who was the same for all participants, sat along-
side the actual participant, and was no longer actively involved in 
the task. The left response button and the stroking device were 
visible on the co-actor’s left side (see Figure 4). The co-actor was 
instructed to watch the behavior of the participant.
RESULTS
Reaction times
The 2 (Compatibility: compatible, incompatible) × 2 (Stroking: syn-
chronous, asynchronous) within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect for Compatibility [F(1,19) = 14.05, 
p < 0.005, η2 = 0.43], showing that responses were faster with stimu-
lus–response compatibility (mean RT = 335 ms) than with stimulus–
response incompatibility (mean RT = 347 ms). The effects of Stroking 
[F(1,19) < 1, η2 = 0.03] and the Compatibility × Stroking interaction 
[F(1,19) < 1, η2 = 0.01; see Figure 5] were not significant. An addi-
tional ANOVA with Order as a between-subjects factor revealed no 
significant interaction [F(1,18) = 1.66, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.08].
FIGURE 4 | Experimental setting in Experiment 2. Gray shaded areas 
indicate areas obscured from view.
FIGURE 5 | Mean reaction time as a function of the type of stimulation 
and spatial stimulus–response compatibility. Error bars represent standard 
errors of the mean differences. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, n.s., not significant.
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Apparatus, stimuli, task, and procedure
These were the same as in the previous experiments, with the fol-
lowing exceptions. Participants carried out the task alone, in the 
absence of any other person, either with the moving stroking device 
(“Device present”) or without the stroking device (“Device absent”) 
operating at the alternative response side (see Figure 6).
The two conditions “Device present” and “Device absent” were 
manipulated within participants. In the “Device present” condition, 
the movements of the device stroking the participant’s left hand and 
the visible device on the left side of the table were asynchronous. 
During the “Device absent” condition, both the response button 
and the stroking device on the participant’s left were removed. 
However, to keep all other factors consistent with the previous 
experiments, the device above the participant’s occluded left hand 
was still present, but no longer stimulated the hand (see Figure 6). 
The participants either started with the “Device present” or the 
“Device absent” condition; the order was counterbalanced across 
participants. Participants were seated on the right chair throughout 
the whole experiment and had to respond with their right index 
finger, pressing the right button. They were instructed to respond 
only to the tone assigned to them irrespective of the location and 
had to fixate on either the stroking device (“Device present”) or a 
similar point on the empty table (“Device absent”; see Figure 6).
RESULTS
Reaction times
A 2 (Compatibility: compatible, incompatible) × 2 (Device: device 
present, device absent) within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed a significant interaction of Compatibility × Device 
[F(1,19) = 4.54, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.19; see Figure 7]. Follow-up 
analyses confirmed that the compatibility effect observed in the 
“Device present” condition (9 ms) was significant [F(1,19) = 5.53, 
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.23], whereas the reversed compatibility effect in the 
“Device absent” condition (−7 ms, Compatible: mean RT = 314 ms; 
Incompatible: mean RT = 307 ms) was not [F(1,19) < 1, η2 = 0.05; 
see Figure 7]. Participants responded faster with stimulus–
response compatibility (mean RT = 304 ms) than with stimu-
lus–response incompatibility (mean RT = 313 ms) in the “Device 
present” condition, whereas the RTs were slower for compatible 
EXPERIMENT 3
The aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate the role of the pres-
ence of another person in the SSE. According to the weak con-
cept of action co-representation, the co-actor does not function 
as a social actor but mainly as a source that produces particular 
events, which then serve as reference for coding one’s own action. 
Guagnanoa et al. (2010) suggests that spatial response coding would 
be prompted by the presence of another active person in periper-
sonal space, irrespective of whether this person is working on the 
same task or not. Even though the present Experiment 2 suggests 
that this other person can just as well be inactive, the presence of a 
person may still be relevant. However, another possibility is that, 
even though the presence of another person is a particularly sali-
ent event, any salient event – social as well as non-social – could 
propagate referential coding (weak concept). With respect to our 
experimental setup, the mere manipulation of stroking might be 
sufficient to establish a salient non-social event that induces ref-
erential coding.
To test the latter hypothesis, we repeated Experiment 2 by fur-
ther de-socializing the task: We no longer included another per-
son. In one condition, the experimental procedure was the same 
as in Experiment 2, including the stroking device and the stroking 
manipulation (the “Device present” condition). This manipulation 
was expected to establish a salient event on the left side that could 
serve as a landmark for the participant to code his or her action as 
“right.” If so, a SSE would be expected. In the other condition (the 
“Device absent” condition, see Figure 6), the stroking device on the 
participant’s left was no longer present. However, the device above 
the participant’s occluded left hand was still there, but there was 




Twenty new healthy undergraduate students (11 female; 20–30 years 
of age, mean age = 24.9) with no history of neurological or hearing 
problems participated in Experiment 3. They fulfilled the same cri-
teria and were treated in the same as the participants in Experiments 
1 and 2.
FIGURE 6 | Experimental setting in Experiment 3, in the “Device present” (A) and the “Device absent” condition (B). Gray shaded areas indicate areas 
obscured from view.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study was designed to clarify what the notion of action co-
representation might be taken to mean and whether it is necessary for an 
account of the SSE. By experimentally inducing the RHI in an auditory 
social Simon task (in Experiment 1), we investigated whether the SSE 
is mediated by the degree to which actors incorporate other people’s 
actions (or acting effectors) into their own body schema. Although 
we were able to replicate previous findings of Sebanz et al. (2003) and 
reproduced reliable RHIs in the actors, RHI-induced co-representation 
of a co-actor reduced, rather than increased, the SSE. This pattern of 
results provides clear evidence against a strong concept of action co-
representation. Rather, asynchronous stroking apparently emphasized 
the existence of the co-actor, which was likely to provide a landmark for 
the spatial coding of the actor’s response (Guagnanoa et al., 2010). This 
reasoning might be explained by the intermediate concept of action 
co-representation, which allows the separate representation of actor 
and co-actor (Hommel, 1993, 1996; Liepelt et al., 2011).
This interpretation received support from Experiment 2, where 
the other person was no longer actively involved in the task. In 
Experiment 3, however, the salient landmark was no longer a 
social event. In both cases, a reliable Simon effect was obtained 
even though – at least in Experiment 3 – the effect was clearly not 
a “social” effect anymore. In other words, the “SSE” can be induced 
through social as well as through non-social events, indicating that 
even an intermediate concept of action co-representation is not 
necessary to account for the SSE.
This assumption appears to be reasonable when considering the 
task requirements in the single and social Simon go–nogo task. In both 
cases, the spatial coding of responses is unnecessary and, as indicated by 
the absence of substantial Simon effects under some conditions (e.g., 
Hommel, 1996; Sebanz et al., 2003), apparently not obligatory either. 
This suggests that people are able to abstract from most aspects of their 
current environment and focus on what is currently relevant such as 
the action they are to carry out. However, irregular events are known to 
attract attention in a bottom-up fashion and it makes sense to assume 
that this is particularly true for events that are social in nature (Philipp 
and Prinz, 2010; Ruys and Aarts, 2010). This attraction of attention 
seems to be sufficient to induce the tendency or perhaps even the need to 
code one’s action spatially in reference to this attention-attracting event.
In summary, testing predictions from three concepts of action 
co-representation revealed that neither the integration of another 
person’s action into an individual’s body representation (strong 
concept) nor the separate cognitive representation of one’s own 
and the other person’s action (intermediate concept) appear to be 
necessary for the SSE to occur. As even non-social events are suffi-
cient to reliably influence an individual’s own task performance (see 
Experiment 3), it seems to be the presence or expectation of salient 
events as such that underlies the SSE (Vlainic et al., 2010). Moreover, 
the present results suggests, that even the modality of these events 
does not matter much: Both proprioceptive events (resulting from 
the stroking of the participant’s occluded hand) and visual events 
(resulting from the motion of the stroking device in the alternative 
response dimension) were functional in providing a reference frame 
for action coding. Identifying the factors that determine the rela-
tive saliency and the relative contributions of visual, proprioceptive, 
and other information to the SSE represents an important goal for 
future research.
trials (mean RT = 314 ms) compared to incompatible trials (mean 
RT = 307 ms) in the “Device absent” condition. The effects of 
Compatibility and Device were not significant (all Fs < 1). An addi-
tional ANOVA with Order as a between-subjects factor revealed no 
interaction between Compatibility × Device × Order [F(1,18) < 1, 
η2 = 0.02].
Error rates
Neither the effects of Compatibility [F(1,19) = 1.72, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.08] 
and Device [F(1,19) = 2.26, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.11], nor the interaction 
of Compatibility × Device were significant [F(1,19) < 1, η2 = 0.01].
DISCUSSION
To disentangle whether it was the other person or the movement 
of the stroking device that acted as a reference frame for referential 
response coding, we repeated Experiment 2 without another person 
present. We found a significant Simon effect in the “Device present” 
condition but not in the “Device absent” condition, which suggests 
that the stroking device and/or its activities provided a reference 
for the spatial coding of the participant’s own actions.
Given the rather small effects we obtained, these findings need 
to be handled with caution. Nevertheless, the interaction was 
clearly reliable and the sign of the SSE reversed in the “Device 
absent” condition. Moreover, the relatively modest size of the SSE 
in Experiment 3 fits well with the observations from other studies 
(e.g., Guagnanoa et al., 2010, Experiment 1 = 7 ms, Experiment 
2b = 5 ms; Liepelt et al., 2011 = 9 ms; Sebanz et al., 2003 = 8 ms), 
suggesting that the present results are within a comparable range. 
Accordingly, we take these findings as evidence that the SSE can be 
obtained under entirely non-social circumstances.
To test whether the presence of the other person added to the effect 
in Experiment 2, we combined the data from Experiments 2 and 3 and 
performed an ANOVA with Compatibility (compatible, incompatible) 
as a within-subjects factor and Experiment (Experiment 2 – asynchro-
nous stroking condition, Experiment 3 – “Device present” condition) as 
a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed no significant interac-
tion, suggesting that another person is neither necessary nor particularly 
relevant to provide a spatial reference for coding one’s own action. Even 
a non-social salient event seems to have the potential to affect the way 
people represent their action and, thereby, to produce a (no longer so 
social) Simon effect.
FIGURE 7 | Mean reaction time as a function of the type of stimulation 
and spatial stimulus–response compatibility. Error bars represent standard 
errors of the mean differences. *p < 0.05.
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The general observation that a salient event induces referential 
action coding is in line with the assumptions of the theory of event 
coding (Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel, 2004, 2009). The presence 
of another person sitting next to the actor performing his/her 
part of the task represents a salient event that provides an alter-
native for the actor’s own response and thus calls for perceptual 
discrimination between the two (e.g., in terms of “left” vs. “right” 
and “me” vs. “not me”; Hommel et al., 2009; Liepelt et al., 2011). 
Once a response is spatially coded, it provides a reference that is 
compatible or incompatible with respect to the assigned stimulus 
(Guagnanoa et al., 2010). Establishing or using a task-relevant fea-
ture dimension may create feature overlap (Kornblum et al., 1990; 
Lam and Chua, 2009) and feature-correspondence effects, which 
are the basis of the Simon effect and other stimulus–response 
compatibility effects.
Our considerations should not be taken to mean that task shar-
ing – in the sense of considering aspects of someone else’s task in 
one’s own cognitive task representation – is not social at all, nor does 
it imply that social aspects play no role at all in the SSE. As already 
mentioned, social factors like mood (Kuhbandner et al., 2010) or 
interpersonal relationship (Hommel et al., 2009) have been found 
to affect the size and presence of the effect. Nevertheless, these 
effects might well be mediated by the saliency they lend to the 
alternative action and/or actor, and the impact of this saliency on 
referential response coding. Further support for the claim that the 
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